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APPLYING THE COMMON-LAW CAUSE OF ACTION 
NEGLIGENT ENABLEMENT OF IMPOSTER FRAUD TO 
SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES 
Shannon N. Sterritt ∗ 
 
But he that filches from me my good name/Robs me of that 




Social networking sites, such as MySpace, Twitter, Facebook, and 
LinkedIn, are popping up all over the Internet and establishing social 
media as the fastest-growing phenomenon yet.  While radio took thir-
ty-eight years to reach fifty million users and television took thirteen 
years, the Internet took only four years.
2
  Social networking sites, 
however, quickly surpassed these records.  Facebook reached over fif-
ty million users within thirteen months of allowing access to anyone 
with a valid email address.
3
  Today, while continuing to grow at a rap-
id pace, Facebook has more than 750 million users.
4
  LinkedIn, a pro-
fessional social networking site, reached thirty-six million members in 
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 1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3. 
 2 United Nations, Information and Communications Technology, UN 
CYBERSCHOOLBUS 1, 
http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/briefing/technology/tech.pdf (last visited Aug. 
14, 2011). 
 3 Timeline, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/home.php?ref=home#! 
/press/info.php?timeline (last visited Aug.14, 2011). 
 4 Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/facebook?ref=pf#/press/ 
info.php?statistics (last visited Aug. 14 2011). 
 5 Abbey Klaassen, LinkedIn Skyrockets as Job Losses Mount, ADVER. AGE (Mar. 2, 
2009), http://adage.com/digital/article?article_id=134962; see also About Us, 
LINKEDIN, http://press.linkedin.com/about (last visited Aug. 14, 2011) (“As of June 
30, 2011 (the end of the second quarter), professionals are signing up to join Linke-
dIn at a rate that is faster than two new members per second. . . .  As of August 4, 
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Social networking sites provide benefits for users of all ages and 
backgrounds.  Social networking sites allow users the ability to recon-
nect with old friends and make new friends.
6
  These websites offer us-
ers an open forum for public debate on just about any topic imagina-
ble,
7
 which encourages freedom of speech and expression.  In addi-
addition, most social networking sites are “global,” which provides for 
diverse relationships.
8
  Social networking sites are highly effective in 
the world of advertising and sales.
9
  These websites offer traditional 
Internet advertising options in addition to “fan pages” and “groups,” 
which provide an interactive way to target consumers.
10
  Websites 
created for professional networking and employment searching, such 
as LinkedIn, also exist within the social networking realm.
11
  Studies 
show that social networking sites also provide educational and deve-
lopmental benefits to younger users.
12
 
While the growth of these websites is indicative of their many 
benefits, these websites are becoming a dangerous tool.  In recent 
years, stories of crimes facilitated by the use of social networking sites 
dominated the news.  Stories range from Lori Drew, who used MyS-
pace to “cyberbully” her daughter’s thirteen year-old rival,
13
 to the 
 
2011, LinkedIn operates the world’s largest professional network on the Internet 
with more than 120 million members in over 200 countries and territories.”). 
 6 See Karen Goldberg Goff, Social Networking Benefits Validated, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 
28, 2009, 5:45 AM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/28/social-
networking-benefits-validated/. 
 7 See WHAT IS SOC. NETWORKING, http://www.whatissocialnetworking.com/ (last 
visited Aug. 14, 2011). 
 8 See id.  
 9 See Jean Halliday, Honda’s ‘Social Experiment’ Nets More than 100,000 Facebook 
Fans, ADVER. AGE (Oct. 22, 2009), http://adage.com/article?article_id=139855 (dis-
cussing Honda’s success in recruiting fans to the brand’s Facebook page entitled 
“Everybody Knows Somebody Who Loves a Honda”). 
 10 Id. 
 11 See About Us, LINKEDIN, http://press.linkedin.com/about/ (last visited Aug. 14, 
2011). 
 12 See, e.g., Mizuko Ito et al., The MacArthur Foundation Reports on Digital Media and 
Learning; Living and Learning with New Media: Summary of Findings from the Digital Youth 
Project, MACARTHUR FOUND., (Nov. 2008), 
http://digitalyouth.ischool.berkeley.edu/files/report/digitalyouth-
TwoPageSummary.pdf; Educational Benefits of Social Networking Sites Uncovered, SCI. 
DAILY (June 21, 2008), 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/06/080620133907.htm.    
 13 Jennifer LeClaire, MySpace Mom Indicted in Cyber-Bully Suicide Case, SCI-TECH 
TODAY (May 18, 2009), http://www.sci-tech-today.com/news/MySpace-Mom-
Charged-in-Teen-Death/story.xhtml?story_id=10300CL7QBNV (discussing the in-
dictment of Lori Drew who created a fake MySpace profile to bully her daughter’s 
rival, who committed suicide as a result). 
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Craigslist murders
14
 and sexual assaults.
15
  In addition to these crimes, 
instances of identity theft have escalated as social networking sites 
have become more popular.
16
  A recent Gallup Crime Survey indi-
cated that identity theft provokes greater concern among Americans 
than any other crime, with two in three adults worried about falling 
victim to identity theft.
17
 
Identity theft through the use of social networking sites can oc-
cur in two different ways: (1) an imposter can gather an individual’s 
personal information, such as name, address, and phone number, 
from an existing social networking profile and then use it to obtain 
credit or gain employment in the victim’s name, as well as gain access 
to already established accounts, or (2) an imposter can use another’s 
information to create a false profile on a social networking site, which 
can then result in harm to one’s reputation and possibly one’s finan-
cial and criminal record.  In addition, this latter form of identity theft 
through social networking sites can lead to other crimes facilitated 
through the Internet. 
Although all of the problems associated with social networking 
sites are important and deserve lengthy discussion on what the law 
can do to solve or minimize the effects of these problems, this Com-
ment will focus on the second scenario, that is, when an identity thief 
uses an individual’s information to create a fake profile.  Although 
some imposters might create these fake profiles out of jest, the result 
 
 14 Med Student Arrested In Craigslist Murder, CBS NEWS (Apr. 20, 2009) 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/20/national/main4958272.shtml (detail-
ing an arrest made in the murder of a Boston woman who advertised services on 
Craigslist) 
 15 See, e.g., Shannon Powell, Craigslist Ad Leads to Sexual Assault, KXAN.COM (June 
11, 2009), 
http://www.kxan.com/dpp/news/crime/Craigslist_ad_leads_to_sexual_assault (dis-
cussing the sexual assault of an Austin woman who had arranged to meet the perpe-
trator through Craigslist). 
 16 “Social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter are the new frontier in the 
identity theft battle because of their astounding growth rates.”  Tom Ahearn, Users of 
Popular Social Networking Sites Facebook and Twitter Warned About Identity Theft, MY 
BACKGROUND CHECK BLOG (Oct. 21, 2009, 11:16 AM), 
http://www.mybackgroundcheck.com/blog/post/2009/10/21/Users-of-Popular-
Social-Networking-Sites-Facebook-and-Twitter-Warned-About-Identity-Theft.aspx. 
 17 Lydia Saad, Two in Three Americans Worry About Identity Theft, GALLUP (Oct. 16, 
2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/123713/Two-in-Three-Americans-Worry-About-
Identity-Theft.aspx.  The Poll showed that sixty-six percent of adults in the United 
States worry frequently or occasionally about identity theft.  Id.  The second biggest 
concern was a car brake-in or a car theft, which worried forty-seven percent of Amer-
icans.  Id.  
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of such jokes causes serious harm to their victims.
18
  Of more concern, 
however, are those criminal imposters who create fake profiles with 
the intent to harm their victims. 
This form of imposter fraud is a growing issue for celebrities, 
who have frequently discovered profiles on social networking sites 
that they did not create.  In 2007, Prince William had a fake Face-
book profile of “William Wales” removed from the site.
19
  Earlier that 
year, Sarah Palin sent a message through her Twitter account “AK-
GovSarahPalin” apologizing for false information coming from an 
imposter behind the fake Twitter account “EXGovSarahPalin.”
20
  The 
manager of the St. Louis Cardinals, Tony LaRussa, had a fake Twitter 
account taken down when the perpetrator posted “derogatory and 
demeaning” messages about his DUI charge and the death of two 
Cardinals players.
21
  And more recently, imposters created fake MyS-
pace and Facebook profiles in the names of Penguins’ players Sidney 
Crosby and Evgeni Malkin to solicit money from the public for the 
stated, but false, purpose of benefiting a Minneapolis park.
22
 
The imposter problem, however, extends beyond the world of 
the famous and affects the average person, who most likely does not 
have the resources or clout to fix the problem before serious harm 
results.  In Oregon, Cynthia Barnes’s ex-boyfriend created a fake Ya-
hoo profile in her name, which included her address, phone num-
ber, and nude photographs of her.
23
  In San Antonio, Texas, high 
school students created a fake MySpace profile of the assistant prin-
cipal containing false information about her sexual orientation and 
practices, as well as obscene comments and content.
24
  The numerous 
examples of imposter profiles surfacing on social networking sites 




 18 David Wood, No Easy Remedy for Imposter Postings on Social Networking Sites, 
CONSUMER AFF. (Mar. 17, 2008), 
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2008/03/myspace_impostors.html. 
 19 Jason Cato, Great Fake Out: Cyber-Posers Make Life Tough for Celebs, PITTSBURGH 
TRIB. REV. (July 16, 2009) (on file with author). 
 20 Id.  
 21 Id.  
 22 Id.  
 23 Wendy Davis, Texas Lawmakers Crackdown on Fake Profiles, MEDIA POST NEWS 
(June 8, 2009), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles. 
showArticle&art_aid=107518. 
 24 Chris Gatewood, Fake User Profiles: Free Speech or Defamation, SITEPOINT (Nov. 7, 
2008), http://articles.sitepoint.com/article/fake-social-networking-profiles. 
 25 See Wood, supra note 18 (describing cases of imposter fraud on social network-
ing sites). 
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The common-law tort of negligent enablement of imposter 
fraud, however, may be the solution to this growing problem.  Negli-
gent enablement of imposter fraud has traditionally (but sparingly) 
been used in the context of financial institutions;
26
 however, this 
cause of action is still viable in the social networking site context.  
This Comment argues that a third party can hold social networking 
sites liable for their failure to prevent imposter fraud from occurring 
through the cause of action of negligent enablement of imposter 
fraud.  Although the Communications Decency Act’s (CDA or “the 
Act”) immunity provision has been a traditional bar to most lawsuits 
against social networking sites, recent reinterpretations suggest a nar-
rower reading of the immunity statute, which would allow for claims 
in the instance of imposter fraud.
27
  In the alternative, Congress 
should amend the Act, explicitly allowing for the prevention of im-
poster fraud. 
This Comment argues that social networking sites are at risk for 
liability under negligent enablement of imposter fraud because they 
owe a duty to the public-at-large to attempt to prevent imposter 
fraud.  A social networking site’s failure to impose reasonable proce-
dures is therefore a breach of that duty.  Expanding the tort of negli-
gent enablement of imposter fraud into the realm of social network-
ing sites will give victims of imposter fraud a remedy and force these 
sites to put reasonable verification standards in place, ultimately de-
creasing the prevalence of identity theft on these sites. 
Part II of this Comment explores how social networking sites 
function and how the law has defined identity theft.  Part II further 
details the existing legislation governing social networking sites.  In 
addition, Part II also looks at the current legislation addressing iden-
tity theft and the ineffectiveness in providing relief to victims of im-
poster fraud on social networking sites.  Part III proposes expanding 
the common-law tort of negligent enablement of imposter fraud as a 
solution to this problem.  Part III shows how the CDA is no longer a 
bar to such a cause of action, and how plaintiffs could succeed on 
their claims. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Social networking sites dominate the current age with a majority 
of individuals having at least one social networking account.  With 
this craze, however, came an increase in identity theft of all forms.  
 
 26 See infra Part III.A. 
 27 See infra Part II.C. 
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Although there are federal and state statues criminalizing identity 
theft and attempting to curb its prevalence, unfortunately, imposter 
fraud on social networking sites presents a whole set of problems that 
are not regulated by the current statutes. 
A. Social Networking Sites: New Age Means of Communication 
Social networking sites, such as MySpace, Facebook, and Twitter, 
dominate the Internet and have forever changed the way people inte-
ract and communicate.  The features offered on social networking 
sites vary from site to site; however, most sites center on the idea of a 
user-maintained profile that is linked to other users of the site 
through communities and networks.
28
  As the court in Doe v. MySpace, 
Inc. explained, 
[S]ocial networking web site[s] . . . allow[] [their] members to 
create online “‘profiles,”‘ which are individual web pages on 
which members post photographs, videos, and information about 
their lives and interests.  The idea of online social networking is 
that members will use their online profiles to become part of an 
online community of people with common interests.  Once a 
member has created a profile, she can extend “‘friend invitations” 
‘to other members and communicate with her friends . . . via e-
mail, instant messaging, or blogs.
29
 
Social networking sites are a fun, interactive form of communi-
cation and provide entertainment for users of all ages and interests.
30
  
In addition, social networking sites provide networking benefits, both 
personal and professional.  The use of “groups,” “fan pages,” and 
other similar features provide mechanisms to locate users with com-
mon interests.  In addition, some social networking sites provide a fo-
 
 28 Richard M. Guo, Note, Stranger Danger and the Online Social Network, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617, 619–20 (2008).  Communities and networks are akin to 
“small rural communities or neighborhood subdivisions.”  WHAT IS SOC.  
NETWORKING, http://www.whatissocialnetworking.com/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2011).   
 29 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845–46 (W.D. Tex. 2007). 
 30 Facebook’s user population is made up of forty-two percent ages eighteen to 
thirty-four, twenty-two percent ages thirteen to seventeen, twenty percent ages thirty-
five to forty-nine, twelve percent ages fifty and over, and four percent ages three to 
twelve.  QUANTCAST, http://www.quantcast.com/ (then type Facebook or MySpace to 
generate current demographic results) (last visited Aug. 14, 2011).  MySpace gene-
rates roughly the same demographic proportions.  Id.  Women aged fifty-five or older 
are the fastest growing group of users on Facebook.  Justin Smith, Fastest Growing De-
mographic on Facebook: Women Over 55, INSIDE FACEBOOK (Feb. 2, 2009), 
http://www.insidefacebook.com/2009/02/02/fastest-growing-demographic-on-
facebook-women-over-55/.  
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rum specifically for professional networking.
31
  A recent survey re-
garding job recruitment indicated that eighty percent of employers 
use or plan to use social networking sites to find employees.
32
 
 The most popular social networking sites are Facebook, MySpace 
Twitter, and LinkedIn.33  “Unique visitors” refers to the number of 
individual people who have visited a particular site one or more times 
within a designated time period.
34
  As of October 1, 2011, Facebook 
has approximately 700,000,000 unique visitors per month, while 
MySpace has 80,500,000 unique visitors.
35
  Twitter and LinkedIn, 
more recent sites, have quickly jumped in the rankings with 
200,000,000 and 100,000,000 unique visitors per month, respective-
ly.
36
  Although many social networking sites exist, this Comment will 
focus on MySpace and Facebook, two of the oldest and most popular 
social networking sites. 
1. MySpace 
MySpace began the social networking craze in 2003.
37
  Over the 
years, MySpace made improvements and additions to the site, but the 
basic format has remained the same.  Individuals join MySpace by en-
tering a name, date of birth, gender, and valid email address.
38
  After 
registering, members enter their personal information on topics 
ranging from “About Me” and “Who I’d Like to Meet,” to more spe-
cific topics, such as an individual’s schools, companies, marital status, 
 
 31 See, e.g., About Us, LINKEDIN, http://press.linkedin.com/about (last visited Aug. 
14, 2011).  
 32 Jobvite Survey Reveals Untapped Potential in Social Networks, JOBVITE (May 13, 
2008), http://recruiting.jobvite.com/news/press-releases/pr/social-recruitment-
survey-release.php.  The survey indicates that employers are recruiting more heavily 
through social networking sites. Id.   
 33 Top 15 Most Popular Social Networking Sites, October 2011, EBIZMBA (Oct. 1 
2011), http://www.ebizmba.com/articles/social-networking-websites [hereinafter 
Top Networking Sites]. 
 34 Jason Bubury et al., Web Analytics Definitions—Version 4.0, WEB ANALYTICS ASS’N,  
9 (Aug. 16, 2007), http://www.webanalyticsassociation.org/ 
resource/resmgr/PDF_standards/WebAnalyticsDefinitionsVol1.pdf. 
 35 Top Networking Sites, supra note 33. 
 36 Id. 
 37 A History of MySpace, RANDOMHISTORY.COM (Aug. 14, 2008), 
http://www.randomhistory.com/2008/08/14_myspace.html (discussing MySpace as 
similar to the already existing social networking site, Friendster); see also Guo supra 
note 28, at 621.  
 38 Sign up for MySpace, MYSPACE, http://signups.myspace.com/index.cfm? 
fuseaction=signup (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
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hometown, and personal preferences.
39
  MySpace members interact 
by sending messages and “friending” each other.
40
  Members can up-
date their profiles to reflect what they are doing and their current 
mood, as well as post favorite videos, photos, and music playlists.
41
  
MySpace has a strong focus on the entertainment world and is a pop-
ular spot for musicians to showcase their music.
42
  In addition, News 
Corp., MySpace’s previous parent company, “helped create MySpace 
Music,” a joint venture with four recording agencies.
43
 
With attempts to create a safe networking space, MySpace estab-
lished terms and conditions, applicable to all users, prohibiting illegal 
conduct.  MySpace’s Terms and Conditions provide for the following: 
By using the MySpace Services, you represent and warrant that (a) 
all registration information you submit is truthful and accurate; 
(b) you will maintain the accuracy of such information; (c) you 
are 13 years of age or older; and (d) your use of the MySpace Ser-
vices does not violate any Applicable Law.
44
 
The Terms and Conditions also prohibit criminal and tortious activi-
ty, such as “child pornography, fraud, trafficking in obscene material, 
drug dealing, gambling, harassment, defamation, stalking, spam-
ming, spimming, sending of viruses or other harmful files, copyright 
infringement, patent infringement, or theft of trade secrets.”
45
  De-
spite these terms, detecting user violations is difficult. 
The age of MySpace members varies, ranging from fourteen 
years old to sixty-five and over; however, trends show MySpace is 
more popular among younger users.
46
  In 2006, MySpace expanded 
 
 39 Profile Edit, MYSPACE, http://home.myspace.com (username and password re-
quired) (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).   
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Greg Sandoval, MySpace to Push Deeper into Entertainment, CNET NEWS (July 10, 
2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10284593-93.html. 
 43 Id. MySpace was sold in June of 2011 to Specific Media and Justin Timberlake. 
Andy Fixmer, News Corp. Calls Quits on MySpace With Specific Media Sale, BUSINESSWEEK 
(June 29, 2011 9:59 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-06-29/news-
corp-calls-quits-on-myspace-with-specific-media-sale.html. 
 44 Myspace.com Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE (June 25, 2009), 
http://www.myspace.com/help/terms. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Matt Dickman, The Age of Facebook v. MySpace: February/March Edition, TECHNO-
MARTKETER (Mar. 10, 2009, 10:38 PM), 
http://technomarketer.typepad.com/technomarketer/2009/03/the-age-of-
facebook-vs-myspace-februarymarch-edition.html; Manoj Jasra, Age Differences Between 
MySpace and Facebook Users, WEBPRONEWS (Feb. 10, 2010, 3:25PM), 
http://www.webpronews.com/age-differences-between-myspace-and-facebook-users-
2010-02.  
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its operations by permitting membership internationally and made its 
website available in several languages.
47
  Although it no longer main-
tains the number one spot, MySpace remains one of the most popu-




Shortly following MySpace, Facebook launched its site in 2004 
from a Harvard dorm room.
49
  Although originally restricted to users 
with a valid university or college “.edu” email address, the site even-
tually allowed access to users with any valid email address.
50
  Similar to 
MySpace, joining Facebook requires that an individual provide an 
email address, name, gender, and date of birth.
51
  Thereafter, the us-
er is prompted to enter optional information, such as high school 
name and graduation year, as well as post a profile picture.
52
  After 
joining, members can connect with other members through “frien-
ding,” posting pictures, updating statuses, creating or joining groups 
and events, and sending messages to other users.  Like MySpace, Fa-
cebook also attempts to stop illegal activity from occurring on its site 
by posting conditions of use that are applicable to all users.  Face-
book’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities states: 
Facebook users provide their real names and information, and we 
need your help to keep it that way.  Here are some commitments 
you make to us relating to registering and maintaining the securi-
ty of your account: You will not provide any false personal infor-
mation on Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than 
yourself without permission . . . .
53
 
As of July 2011, Facebook has grown to over 750 million users 
worldwide.
54
  Facebook members, like those of MySpace, vary in age, 
but the most common members are between the ages of eighteen 
 
 47 See International–MySpace.com, MYSPACE, 
http://www.myspace.com/international (last visited Aug. 14, 2011). 
 48 See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
 49 #158 Mark Zuckerberg: The Forbes 400 Richest Americans 2009, FORBES.COM (Sept. 
30, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/lists/2009/54/rich-list-09_Mark-
Zuckerberg_I9UB.html. 
 50 Timeline, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?timeline (last 
visited Aug. 14, 2011). 
 51 FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2011). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/ 
terms.php?ref=p (last visited Aug. 14, 2011). 
 54 Statistics, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/facebook?ref=pf#/press/info.php?statistics (last visited 
Aug. 14 2011). 
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and twenty-one.
55
  On June 15, 2009, Facebook surpassed MySpace in 




B. Identity Theft: A Growing Problem 
Although identity theft is a well-established crime, it is currently 
the “fastest-growing crime” in the nation.”
57
  The Federal Trade 
Commission estimates that as many as nine million individuals fall 
victim to identity theft each year.
58
  According to federal law, identity 
theft is the knowing transfer, possession, or use of another’s means of 
identification without authority.
59
  One’s “means of identification” is 
defined as “any name or number that may be used, alone or in con-




Identity thieves target people of all demographics, races, gend-
ers, and nationalities.  Identity thieves get an individual’s private in-
formation in a variety of ways—from “basic street theft to sophisti-
cated, organized crime schemes.”
61
  The most common methods that 
identity thieves use to obtain another’s information are: “dumpster 
diving,” when thieves look through trash for papers with personal in-
formation listed; “skimming,” when thieves use a special storage de-
vice to steal credit-card numbers when individuals make a purchase; 
and “phishing,” when thieves send pop-ups or spam to lure people to 
give personal information.
62
  Once an identity thief has a victim’s in-
formation in his or her hands, the thief can transact business as the 
 
 55 Dickman, supra note 46. 
 56 Erick Schonfeld, Facebook Finally Catches up to MySpace in the U.S., TECHCRUNCH 
(June 15, 2009), http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/06/15/facebook-finally-catches-
up-to-myspace-in-the-us/. 
 57 Identity Theft, U. S. POSTAL INSPECTION SERV., 
https://postalinspectors.uspis.gov/investigations/MailFraud/fraudschemes/mailthe
ft/IdentityTheft.aspx (last visited Aug. 14, 2011); accord Consumer Resources, IDENTITY 
THEFT RECOURSE CENTER, http://www.idtheftcenter.org/c_resources/c_intro.shtml 
(last visited Aug. 14, 2011). 
 58 About Identity Theft, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/consumers/about-identity-
theft.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2011). 
 59 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006); see also 16 C.F.R § 603.2(a) (2004). 
 60 § 1028(d)(7). 
 61 S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 6 (1998).  
 62 Take Charge: Fighting Back Against Identity Theft, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/idtheft/idt04.shtm (last visited Aug. 
14, 2011).  Identity thieves also use a change of address form to divert billing state-
ments to the thieves themselves and listen for personal information shared during a 
cell phone conversation.  Id. 
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victim and sometimes become the victim by living and working under 
the victim’s name.
63
  An identity thief can take funds from an individ-




Identity thieves use different forms of identity theft to jeopardize 
an individual’s personal or financial information.
65
  For example, 
identity theft occurs when, upon arrest, an identity thief “poses” as 
another by providing law enforcement with another’s personal identi-
fying information.
66
 Financial fraud identity theft occurs when an 
identity thief uses another’s identifying information for financial 
gain, either by opening new accounts in the victim’s name or by tak-
ing over the victim’s already existing accounts.
67
  A third form, “iden-
tity cloning” or imposter fraud, occurs when an identity thief assumes 
another’s identity by living and working as the victim.
68
 
Imposter fraud on social networking sites has recently become 
popular among identity thieves.
69
  This form of imposter fraud occurs 
when someone uses another’s information to create a profile or web-
page on a social networking site.
70
  Most professionals have enough 
personal information in the public domain that an identity thief can 
easily create an accurate and deceiving “online persona” on a social 
networking site.
71
  Once an imposter has created this profile, he or 
she can act as the victim in the virtual setting by communicating with 
friends, acquaintances, and colleagues of the victim, which provides a 
limitless opportunity for damage.  An imposter can create difficulties 
in employment, ruin professional and personal relationships, and 
damage reputations, as well as steal corporate or financial records 




 63 Om Paramapoonya, 10 Things Identity Theft Victims Must Do, HUB PAGES, 
http://hubpages.com/hub/identity-theft-solutions (last visited Aug. 14, 2011). 
 64 Id.  
 65 Identity Theft (October 2009), NAT’L WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR., 
http://www.nw3c.org (Follow “Research” then “Papers, Publications, Reports” then 
“Papers”) (on file with author). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id.  
 69 See ATTACK INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH CTR., ANNUAL THREAT REPORT: 2008 
OVERVIEW AND 2009 PREDICTIONS 13 (2008), available at  
www.hasp.com/pdf/airc/AIRC-Annual-Threat-Report2008.pdf. 
 70 See id. 
 71 Id.  (“In several experiments performed at the [Attack Intelligence Research 
Center], as well as other facilities, a simulated fake online persona ended up con-
necting to the real network of acquaintances rather easily.”).  
 72 Id. 
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Identity theft in any form takes an incredible toll on its victims.  
With the potential to ruin a victim’s credit and financial history, taint 
his or her criminal record, and destroy his or her reputation, identity 
theft is a common fear among Americans.
73
  In addition, victims dedi-
cate large amounts of time to clearing their names.
74
  Although it has 
been around for many years, identity theft has increased with the in-
troduction of the Internet.  Today, the information needed to steal 
someone’s identity is likely just a few clicks away. 
C. Regulation for Social Networking Sites: The Communications 
Decency Act 
 Title V of the Telecommunications Act, also known as the 
CDA,
75
 regulates offensive material on the Internet.
76
  Section 230 of 
the CDA states, “No provider or user of an interactive computer ser-
vice shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”
77
  Courts interp-
ret this statute to provide a broad immunity, which encompasses 
MySpace and similar social networking websites.
78
  The CDA also pro-
vides a “Good Samaritan” provision that limits the liability of those 
providers or users who take action or provide the technical means to 
restrict access to material that the providers consider obscene.
79
 
Congress enacted § 230 in response to Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. 
Prodigy Services Co.
80
  In Stratton, the New York Supreme Court for Nas-
 
 73 Saad, supra note 17. 
 74 Fighting Identity Theft—The Role of FCRA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on  Fin. 
Insts. & Consumer Credit of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 15 (2002) (state-
ment of Daniel L. Mihalko, Inspector in Charge, Cong. and Pub. Affairs, U.S. Postal 
Inspection Service) (“It generally takes about 44 months to clear up their cases, and 
victims report that they spend on average 175 hours actively trying to restore their 
credit rating and to clear their good name.”); see also IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 
IDENTITY THEFT: THE AFTERMATH 2008 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/1/Aftermath_2008_20090520.pdf 
(noting that when an imposter opened a new account, victims spent approximately 
165 hours clearing their names).  
 75 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
47 U.S.C. (1996)). 
 76 See Ken S. Meyers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications Decency Act to Wikipe-
dia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163, 172 (2006).  
 77 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).  “The term ‘interactive computer service’ means 
any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables 
computer access by multiple users to a computer server . . . .” § 230(f)(2).   
 78 See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846 (W.D. Tex. 2007).  
 79 § 230(c)(2). 
 80 No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995); see 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10.  
STERRITT_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2011  1:47 PM 
2011] COMMENT 1707 
sau County held that the interactive computer service provider Prod-
igy was liable for defamatory statements on its website because its abil-
ity to delete offensive material demonstrated its control, which the 
court found rose to a level similar to that of a publisher over the con-
tent of the website.
81
  In enacting § 230, Congress disapproved of the 
Stratton decision: 
[Section 230] provides “Good Samaritan” protections from civil 
liability for providers . . . of an interactive computer service for ac-
tions to restrict . . . access to objectionable online material.  One 
of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-
Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have 
treated such providers . . . as publishers or speakers of content 




The § 230 immunity aims “to keep government interference in 
the medium to a minimum.”
83
  Representatives Christopher Cox and 
Ron Wyden, who proposed § 230, wanted to limit the role of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission in regulating material on the In-
ternet and instead, using filtering software, place the burden on par-
ents to regulate their children’s Internet activity.
84
  The CDA lists sev-
several policy goals of the immunity provision: 
1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and 
other interactive computer services and other interactive media; 
2)  to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that pre-
sently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer ser-
vices, unfettered by Federal or State regulation; 
3) to encourage the development of technologies which maxim-
ize user control over what information is received by individuals, 
families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive 
computer services; 
4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of 
blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to re-
strict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate on-
line material; and 
5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to de-
ter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment 




 81 Stratton, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *13–14.    
 82 H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194. 
 83 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 84 See generally 141 CONG. REC. H8460–70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (Statements of 
Rep. Cox and Rep. Wyden). 
 85 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006). 
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The CDA expressly allows states to enact legislation consistent 
with the CDA; however, states cannot create a cause of action that 
would be inconsistent with the Act, such as holding an interactive 
computer service provider or user liable as the publisher of informa-
tion produced by another information content provider.
86
 
Much of the litigation that has involved social networking sites 
has focused on the CDA-immunity issue.  The past disputes that 
raised the CDA-immunity issue arose in the context of defamation 
and other negligence claims as well as suits involving online sexual 
predators.  For example, in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., anonymous 
postings of offensive advertisements, which contained the plaintiff’s 
contact information, caused the plaintiff to receive death threats and 
other harassing phone calls.
87
  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, addressing whether America Online could be held li-
able for failing to remove advertisements after being notified of their 
fraudulent nature, held that the CDA, “[b]y its plain language, . . . 
creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make 
service providers liable for information originating with a third-party 
user of the service.”
88
  The court also noted that imposing liability in 
such a situation would force website operators to screen every posting 




Almost ten years later, in Doe v. MySpace, the U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Texas extended the immunity to social 
networking sites.
90
  Thirteen-year-old Julie Doe was sexually assaulted 
by a nineteen-year-old male whom she met through MySpace.
91
  The 
court rejected the plaintiff’s argument for a narrow interpretation of 
§ 230 immunity and thus excluded her claim of negligent failure to 
implement basic safety measures to prevent sexual predators from 
communicating with minors.
92
  The plaintiff argued that her claim 
fell outside the scope of § 230 because she did not base her claim on 
third-party content and did not direct her claim at the site in its ca-
pacity as an editor or publisher.
93
  The court noted several cases in 
which courts granted § 230 immunity for claims of negligence and 
 
 86 § 230(e)(3). 
 87 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 88 Id. at 330. 
 89 Id. at 331, 333. 
 90 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846, 849–50 (W.D. Tex. 2007). 
 91 Id. at 846. 
 92 Id. at 848–50. 
 93 Id. at 848. 
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declined to restrict the immunity to claims involving defamation or 
actions involving the content of the information on the website.
94
 
Recently, however, courts have reconsidered past interpretations 
of the CDA that gave Internet service providers (ISPs) blanket im-
munity from all civil-liability claims.
95
  For example, although ulti-
mately finding that Craigslist was not liable for information posted by 
a third party, in Chicago Lawyers’ Committee v. Craigslist, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reinterpreted § 230 immunity:  
“Subsection (c)(1) does not mention ‘immunity’ or any synonym. . . . 
[Section] 230(c) as a whole cannot be understood as a general pro-
hibition of civil liability for web-site operators and other online con-
tent hosts.”
96
  Quoting an earlier opinion to explain its holding, the 
court questioned, “Why should a law designed to eliminate ISPs’ lia-
bility to the creators of offensive material end up defeating claims by 
the victims of tortious or criminal conduct?”
97
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed that the 
traditionally broad immunity should be construed more narrowly 
than courts had in the past.  In Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, 
the court held that Roommates.com was not entitled to § 230 immun-
ity because it became an information content provider through its 
standardized questionnaire.
98
  The court noted that Congress passed 
§ 230 to allow ISPs the opportunity to engage in some editing of user-
generated content without the risk of becoming liable for the defa-
matory content they did not edit or delete.
99
  The CDA “was not 
meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.”
100
  A more 
recent Ninth Circuit decision reaffirmed the Roommates.com reinter-
pretations by holding that the immunity provision applies only when 
a provider or user of an interactive computer service is being treated 
 
 94 Id. at 849.  The Doe court also considered the case under Texas common law 
and determined that no legal duty existed to hold the social networking site liable 
under a theory of common-law negligence.  The court determined that requiring a 
duty to confirm or determine the age of applicants would “stop MySpace’s business 
in its tracks,” ultimately shutting down this method of communication.  Id. at 851.  
 95 See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th 
Cir. 2008); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 
F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 96 519 F.3d at 669. 
 97 Id. at 670 (quoting Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659–60 (7th Cir 2003)). 
 98 521 F.3d at 1164. 
 99 Id. at 1163. 
 100 Id. at 1164. 
STERRITT_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2011  1:47 PM 
1710 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1695 




D. Regulations for Identity Theft 
Because identity theft is an increasing problem in the United 
States, state and federal legislatures have continually returned to the 
drawing board to enact laws to cover all facets of the crime.  Over the 
years, legislatures have enacted statutes that range from laws estab-
lishing identity theft as a crime to those regulating privacy and data 
collection in an attempt to prevent identity theft from occurring in 
the first place.  But as the times and technology keep progressing, 
various methods of identity theft fall outside the reach and protection 
of the law and thus provide little remedy or help to victims. 
1. Federal Regulations 
Although federal laws have made great strides in combating 
identity theft, the number of victims affected by the crime continues 
to increase.
102
  In 1998, Congress established identity theft as a crime 
through the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act.
103
 The 
Act imposes criminal penalties upon offenders, including fines and 
up to fifteen years of imprisonment.
104
  Although the unauthorized 
use or transfer of identifying documents and credit cards was illegal 
prior to 1998, the Act added a provision criminalizing the use or 
transfer of identifying information.
105
  By doing so, Congress recog-
nized that criminals do not need documents to assume another’s 
identity; they generally just need the information.
106
  Congress later 
enacted the Internet False Identification Prevention Act, which cov-
ers exclusively problems of identity theft stemming from the Inter-
net.
107
  The Act expanded 18 U.S.C. § 1028 to include as a crime the 




 101 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 102 2009 Identity Theft Statistics, SPENDONLIFE, 
http://www.spendonlife.com/guide/2009-identity-theft-statistics (last visited Aug. 14, 
2011) (stating that between 2007 and 2008 the number of identity-theft victims in-
creased twenty-two percent). 
 103 Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006)). 
 104 Id.; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-766, IDENTITY THEFT: AWARENESS 
AND USE OF IDENTITY THEFT DATA 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02766.pdf. 
 105 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 104, at 1. 
 106 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7); see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 104. 
 107 Pub. L. No. 106-578, 114 Stat. 3075 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006)). 
 108 See id. 
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Congress also imposed an “affirmative and continuing obliga-
tion” on financial institutions to protect consumers’ privacy.
109
  The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires financial institutions to put appro-
priate standards in place to protect against threats to the security or 
integrity of customer records and unauthorized access or use of cus-
tomer records and information.
110
 
In addition, Congress enacted the Federal Credit Reporting 
Act
111
 “to “promote efficiency in the Nation’s banking system and to 
protect consumer privacy.”
112
  The Act requires that credit-reporting 
agencies create reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of the 
information contained in consumer credit reports and limit the avail-
ability of these reports.
113
  The Federal Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act of 2003 (FFACT), which amended the Federal Cre-
dit Reporting Act, focuses primarily on consumer reporting agencies 
and the use of credit reports and credit scores.
114
  FFACT addresses 
additional issues, such as the procedures a business must set up for 
consumer claims of identity theft, the ability to sell or transfer debt 
involving identity theft, what may be printed on a credit- or debit-card 
receipt, and the credit- or debit-card change-of-address process.
115
  
Despite Congress’s continued efforts to enact legislation combating 
identity theft, the problem still prevails. 
2. State Regulations 
In addition to the federal legislation enacted, most states have 
enacted their own statutes involving identity theft.
116
  These statutes, 
 
 109 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2006)). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 602, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006)). 
 112 TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 23 (2001) (citing § 1681(a)(2006)). 
 113 Id.; § 1681(b) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer 
reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce 
for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which 
is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, 
relevancy, and proper utilization of such information.”);  see also id. § 1681b (Permiss-
ible Purposes of Consumer Reports); id. § 1681c (Requirements Relating to Informa-
tion Contained in Consumer Reports). 
 114 Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003)(amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–
1681x); see also Holly K. Towle, Identity Theft: Myths, Methods, and New Law, 30 
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 237, 269–71 (2004). 
 115 §§ 1681–1681x ; see also Towle, supra note 114. 
 116 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-8-190–13A-8-201 (LEXIS through 2010 acts); ALASKA 
STAT. § 11.46.565 (LEXIS through 2009 1st Session); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008 
(LEXIS through the forty-ninth legislature); CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.5-530.8 (LEXIS 
through 2009–10 Extraordinary Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9-120–16-9-132 (LEXIS 
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however, do little more than declare identity theft a crime and out-
line the punishment.  While the language of each state’s statutes va-
ries, all state statutes attempt to criminalize the transfer or use of 
another’s personal identifying information.
117
  States create different 
degrees or classes of crime and base such distinctions on a number of 
factors, including how much information the identity thief pos-
sessed,
118
 the benefit received or value of the goods received,
119
 and 
who the victim was.
120
 
Although most statutes punish only the identity thief, some state 
statutes impose liability on third parties.  For example, a Washington 
statute imposes a duty on anyone who was involved in the fraudulent 
transaction to provide all transactional information to the victim 
upon a written request.
121
  In doing so, the Washington Legislature 
places financial institutions at risk for liability in the event of imposter 
fraud.  With the exception of Washington’s statute, however, state 
regulations on identity theft fail to do more than simply criminalize 
the act. 
E. Lack of Legal Redress Available to Victims of Imposter Fraud on 
Social Networking Sites 
Over the years social networking sites have developed from an 
innocent, fun method of socializing into today’s primary mode of 
communication for both personal and professional matters.
122
  This 
 
through 2009 Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-17 (West 2009); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 
190.77–190.84 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 
32.51 (LEXIS through 2009 1st Called Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.35.020 
(West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation). 
 117 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-192 ( LEXIS through 2010 acts) (“A person com-
mits the crime of identity theft if, without the authorization, consent, or permission 
of the victim . . . he or she . . . [o]btains, records, or accesses identifying information 
. . . .”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-17 (West 2009) (“A person is guilty of an offense if the 
person . . . [o]btains any personal identifying information pertaining to another per-
son and uses that information, or assists another person in using the information . . . 
.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.35.020 (West, Westlaw through 2009) (“No person may 
knowingly obtain, possess, use, or transfer a means of identification or financial in-
formation of another person . . . .”). 
 118 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-903 (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.) (varying the 
classes for criminal possession of a financial device based on how many devices the 
thief has). 
 119 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-129b–c (LEXIS through 2008 Feb. Sess.) (im-
posing a Class B felony if the value of the benefit exceeds $10,000 and a Class C felo-
ny if the value of the benefit exceeds $5,000). 
 120 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-227 (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.) (heightening 
the penalty if the victim is “an elder person or disabled person”). 
 121 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.35.040(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009). 
 122 ATTACK INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH CTR., supra note 69. 
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expansion, however, has not been all fun and games.  Although the 
social networking sites are constantly trying to improve their security 
protections to avoid spammers and hijackers from gaining access, 
these sites currently operate with limited regulations and legal conse-
quences.
123
  The majority of social networking sites, including Face-
book and MySpace, have no system in place to verify that users are 
who they say they are.
124
  In turn, social networking sites provide iden-
tity thieves with limitless opportunities to perpetrate identity crimes.
125
 
Under the Federal Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence 
Act and various state identity-theft laws, victims of imposter fraud on 
social networking sites are able to seek redress by directly pursuing 
criminal and civil penalties against their imposters.
126
  This option, 
however, is not always available because, before filing a claim, a plain-
tiff would need to track down the imposter’s true identity through 
the maze of the virtual world, which allows imposters to hide behind 
IP addresses and pseudonyms.
127
  Moreover, even if the victim discov-
ers the impostor’s identity, he or she might still have a difficult time 
recovering damages if the imposter is insolvent.  In addition, it is 
possible that if the court considers the fraudulent profile a mere pa-
rody, there may be no legal remedy available.
128
 
Apart from the state and federal legislation imposing criminal or 
civil penalties on identity theft, the current identity-theft legislation is 
outside the scope of most, if not all, claims of imposter fraud on so-
cial networking sites.  Although state and federal legislatures have 
begun enacting laws to combat the prevalence of identity theft, these 
statutes primarily focus on identity theft in the context of credit or fi-
 
 123 See, e.g., Privacy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php?ref=pf (last 
visited Aug. 14, 2011); see supra Part II.C.  
 124 Wood, supra note 18; see also ALADDIN KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS, supra note 69 (de-
scribing the potential for an “online nightmare . . . unless a more reliable, trustwor-
thy model of easily connecting an online persona to a true person catches up with 
social networking sites”). 
 125 ATTACK INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH CTR., supra note 69. 
 126 See supra notes 103–15 and accompanying text (detailing the federal law crimi-
nalizing identity theft); see also supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text (detailing 
state laws criminalizing identity theft). 
 127 See Evan Brown, Maryland Court of Appeals Addresses Important Question of Internet 
Anonymity, INTERNET CASES BLOG (Mar. 8, 2009), 
http://blog.internetcases.com/2009/03/08/maryland-court-of-appeals-addresses-
important-question-of-internet-anonymity/ (discussing the varying standards jurisdic-
tions use in determining whether to grant a subpoena for the operating service to 
reveal the identity of the poster).   
 128 Wood, supra note 18.  
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nancial fraud.
129
 The Federal Credit Reporting Act and FFACT, for 
example, establish standards for credit reporting and the dissemina-
tion of an individual’s private information, which is useless to a victim 
of imposter fraud on social networking sites.
130
  Unlike financial insti-
tutions and credit-reporting agencies, social networking sites are not 
subject to any federal or state regulations; thus, they have free reign 
over how or whether they should monitor and regulate their sites.  
Victims of imposter fraud on social networking sites should be able to 
seek redress from the people or institutions that made the crime 
possible in the first place.  Requiring these individuals to directly pur-
sue the perpetrator after the fact does not get at the heart of the 
problem—preventing imposter fraud from occurring in the first 
place. 
III. NEGLIGENT ENABLEMENT OF IMPOSTER FRAUD:  
A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF IMPOSTER FRAUD ON SOCIAL 
NETWORKING SITES 
The common-law tort of negligent enablement of imposter 
fraud is the most relevant legal mechanism available to victims of im-
poster fraud, absent action by either state legislatures or Congress 
that imposes regulations on social networking sites.  Although courts 
generally disfavor this cause of action in the realm of identity theft 
through financial institutions,
131
 courts have yet to examine the tort in 
the context of imposter fraud on social networking sites.  Negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud could be the saving grace for victims of 
imposter fraud because it provides victims with legal redress and 
forces social networking sites to prevent identity theft on their web-
sites in the first place. 
A. Common-Law Tort of Negligent Enablement of Imposter Fraud 
Plaintiffs largely use the common-law cause of action of negli-
gent enablement of imposter fraud when a financial institution’s neg-
ligence assists or furthers an imposter’s effort to steal their identi-
ties.
132
  Plaintiffs generally use the tort to hold a financial institution 
 
 129 See supra Part II.D (discussing the current regulations in the field of identity 
theft). 
 130 See supra notes 111–15 and accompanying text.  
 131 See infra Part III.A. 
 132 See, e.g., Patrick v. Union State Bank, 681 So. 2d 1364, 1365–66 (Ala. 1996) (de-
tailing how a bank’s failure to verify the identity of an individual opening an account 
resulted in an imposter incurring $1,500 worth of debt in the plaintiff’s name, which 
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liable for identity theft that occurred at or with the help of the insti-
tution.
133
  Although the financial institution was not the actual identi-
ty thief, its negligence allowed the identity theft to occur.
134
  Victims 
bring claims of negligent enablement of imposter fraud because 
identity-theft victims have difficulty receiving compensation for their 
injuries from their actual imposters.
135
 
To establish a claim for negligent enablement of imposter fraud, 
a plaintiff must, as in all negligence claims, prove duty, breach, causa-
tion, and injury.
136
  In the context of financial institutions, a plaintiff 
must show that the financial institution had a duty to protect the 
plaintiff from identity theft.  Then, the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant negligently enabled the identity theft, thereby breaching 
the duty owed to the plaintiff and causing damages.  Courts and scho-
lars, however, have heavily debated whether a duty exists to prevent 
imposter fraud or identity theft from occurring to a third party.
137
 
Courts throughout the nation have given mixed reviews to neg-
ligent enablement of imposter fraud, with some recognizing the 
cause of action and others refusing to recognize the tort or placing 
limits on its application.  For example, the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama upheld a claim of negligent enablement of imposter fraud in 
Patrick v. Union State Bank.
138
  The court discussed the key factors in 
determining whether a duty existed—foreseeability, the nature of the 
defendant’s activity, the relationship between the parties, and the po-
tential injury or harm.
139
  After considering these factors, the court 
held that banks do in fact have a duty to the public-at-large.
140
  A spe-
cial relationship existed because of “the importance of, and the pub-
lic trust placed in, the banking industry.”
141
  The court further held 
that a special relationship existed because the injury was foreseeable 
 
ultimately resulted in the plaintiff’s arrest and incarceration for ten consecutive 
days). 
 133 See e.g., id. at 1366–67. 
 134 See id. at 1367. 
 135 Anthony E. White, Comment, The Recognition of a Negligence Cause of Action for 
Victims of Identity Theft: Someone Stole My Identity, Now Who’s Going to Pay for It?, 88 
MARQ. L. REV. 847, 848 (2005). 
 136 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1979). 
 137 See, e.g., Patrick, 681 So. 2d at 1367–68; Piscitelli v. Classic Residence by Hyatt, 
973 A.2d 948, 963 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009); Huggins v. Citibank, N.A., 585 
S.E.2d. 275, 277 (S.C. 2003). 
 138 Patrick, 681 So.2d at 1371–72.  The court never explicitly referred to the cause 
of action as negligent enablement of imposter fraud.  See generally id. 
 139 Id. at 1368–69. 
 140 Id. at 1369. 
 141 Id. 
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and the bank was in the best position to prevent the harm from oc-
curring.
142
  Subsequent treatment of the holding in Patrick, however, 
is less favorable to recognizing negligent enablement of imposter 
fraud as a remedy to victims of imposter fraud at financial institu-
tions.  Alabama courts have distinguished, limited, and criticized the 
Patrick holding,
143




Like the Alabama court, the South Carolina Court of Appeals al-
so held a financial institution liable to a third party for failing to fol-
low the procedures.
145
  This failure led to the victim’s stolen identity.
146
  
The court held that the bank owed a duty of care to the victim of the 
identity theft when the victim asked the bank to close the fraudulent-
ly opened accounts.
147
  The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, 
later held that South Carolina would not recognize negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud.
148
 
Several state courts expressly refuse to recognize the tort of neg-
ligent enablement of imposter fraud.  These courts rely on two cases 
that held that financial institutions have no relationship with, and 
therefore no duty to, victims of imposter fraud.
149
  In Polzer v. TRW, 
Inc., the New York Intermediate Appellate Court held that New York 
does not recognize a cause of action for negligent enablement of im-
 
 142 Id. at 1369, 1371. 
 143 See, e.g., Flying J Fish Farm v. Peoples Bank of Greensboro, 12 So. 3d 1185, 
1194–95 (Ala. 2008) (distinguishing Patrick on the fact that the bank was not in the 
best position to prevent the harm and that the bank intended that the loan-approval 
policies would protect the bank, not the customer); Smith v. AmSouth Bank, Inc., 
892 So. 2d 905, 911 (Ala. 2004) (explaining that although the result may have been 
the same, the “inquiry in Patrick was not properly focused”). 
 144 See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 301 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(citing Patrick as authority contrary to its decision); Guerra v. Regions Bank, 188 
S.W.3d 744, 748 (Tex. App. 2006) (refusing to follow Patrick); Nicholl v. Nationsbank 
of Ga., N.A., 488 S.E.2d 751, 753 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (limiting Patrick to its facts).  
 145 Murray v. Bank of Am., 580 S.E.2d 194, 198 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) 
 146 Id. at 196–97. 
 147 Id. at 198. 
 148 See infra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 149 See, e.g., Fargis v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs., No. 1:07-1507-MBS, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2398 (D.S.C. Jan. 12, 2009) (holding, a similar position to Huggins, 
that a special relationship that gave rise to a legal duty did not exist between plaintiff 
and AmEx); Smith v. Citibank, N.A., No. 00-0587-CV-W-1-ECF, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
25047 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2001) (holding a, similar position to Polzer, that financial 
institutions do not have a duty to non-customers because a special relationship does 
not exist). 
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poster fraud.
150
  The court further held that the plaintiffs and the fi-
nancial institutions do not have a special relationship that gives rise 
to a traditional claim of negligence.
151
  The South Carolina Supreme 
Court, ignoring the previous appellate decision which held to the 
contrary, joined New York’s rejection of the negligent enablement of 
imposter fraud claim in Huggins v. Citibank.
152
  The court held that is-
suers of credit cards do not have a legal duty to victims of identity 
theft because the relationship is too attenuated.
153
  The court opined 
that, although the harm is foreseeable, foreseeability alone is not 
enough to give rise to a duty.
154
  The court noted that victims of credit 
card fraud have remedies available through current state and federal 
legislation, and although these remedies may not always fully com-




A 2007 opinion from the District of Tennessee, however, criti-
cized Huggins and held that a bank has a duty to verify the authentici-
ty and accuracy of a credit account application.
156
  The court found 
that the Huggins court’s reliance on the absence of a prior business 
relationship between the victim and the bank was flawed.
157
  The de-
termination of whether a duty exists should involve an “ex-
amin[ation] [of] all relevant circumstances with an emphasis on the 
foreseeability of the alleged harm.”
158
 
In addition to recognizing the tort of negligent enablement of 
imposter fraud against financial institutions, the New Jersey Appellate 
Division recently discussed the tort in the employment context.  The 
court addressed whether employers are liable for failing to verify the 
identity of prospective employees.
159
  In Piscitelli v. Classic Residence by 
Hyatt, an immigrant woman used the plaintiff’s name and social secu-
rity number, which she purchased for $800 from an unidentified per-
 
 150 256 A.D.2d 248, 249 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). The court does not explain its rea-
soning for not recognizing this cause of action.  See id.  
 151 Id. 
 152 585 S.E.2d 275, 276 (S.C. 2003).   
 153 Id. at 277.   
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 277–78 
 156 Wolfe v. MBNA Am. Bank, 485 F. Supp. 2d 874, 881–82 (W.D. Tenn. 2007). 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 882.  The court held that a duty exists because the idea that harm will re-
sult from the negligent issuance of a credit card is foreseeable.  Id.  
 159 See Piscitelli v. Classic Residence by Hyatt, 973 A.2d 948, 959 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2009).  
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son, to obtain employment as a maid with the defendant.
160
  The 
plaintiff sought to hold the defendant liable for negligently enabling 
the imposter to become lawfully employed using her information.
161
  
Although the appellate division recognized that identity theft and 
harm to an unrelated third-party was reasonably foreseeable when 
employers fail to verify the identity of their prospective employees, 
the court nonetheless held that an employer does not have a duty to 
third parties to verify a prospective employee’s identity.
162
  Taking in-
to consideration questions of fairness and policy, the court deter-
mined that the burden imposed on an employer would be too great 




Although the claim of negligent enablement of imposter fraud 
has received less than favorable treatment from the courts in the con-
text of financial institutions and employment, only a few states have 
addressed the tort thus far.
164
  With the continued prevalence of iden-
tity theft and the lack of effective solutions, however, the claim of 
negligent enablement of imposter fraud remains a possible avenue 
for plaintiffs to seek redress. 
B. The Communications Decency Act: A Traditional Bar to Claims 
Against Social Networking Sites 
To hold a social networking site liable for negligent enablement 
of imposter fraud, a plaintiff must first establish that the CDA’s im-
munity provision does not defeat the claim.  Unfortunately, most 
courts have interpreted § 230 as providing social networking sites 
with broad immunity insulating these sites from certain civil law-
suits.
165
  The case law, however, does not completely foreclose liability 
for social networking sites for failure to implement reasonable securi-
ty measures.  More recently, courts have begun to recognize that the 
Internet provides a mode of communication that no longer needs 
this insulation to thrive, especially in light of the vast amount of harm 
 
 160 Id. at 951. 
 161 Id. at 962–63. 
 162 Id. at 967 (“[T]he ability to foresee an injury does not in itself establish the ex-
istence of a duty.”). 
 163 Id.  The court also noted that adopting this new duty would “upset traditional 
concepts and basic principles dealing with protection and remedies in the field of 
identity theft” because the legislature has enacted a statute providing victims a reme-
dy through the imposter.  Id. 
 164 Kristin E. Solomon, Facing Identity Theft: New Victim’s Rights Act Imposes New Rules 
to Protect You, 12 TENN. B.J. 12, 14 (2004). 
 165 See supra Part II.C (discussing cases interpreting § 230 as a broad immunity). 
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facilitated by the Internet over the years.
166
  In turn, courts have be-
gan to revisit and reinterpret the § 230 immunity provision.
167
 
1. Plaintiffs May Sue Social Networking Sites for Negligent 
Enablement of Imposter Fraud Regardless of the CDA 
Because the § 230 Immunity Does Not Apply. 
When interpreting legislation, courts look to the plain language 
of the statute and the legislative history.
168
  Applying these principles 
to § 230, it becomes evident that the Act meant to provide protection 
for those interactive computer services that attempt to screen or 
block offensive material, not to provide a blanket immunity to those 
who fail to do anything to screen material. 
Congress enacted the § 230 immunity provision as part of Title V 
of the Telecommunications Act, which is entitled “Obscenity and Vi-
olence.”
169
  Section 230’s title is “Protection for private blocking and 
screening of offensive material” and § 230(c)’s title is “Protection for 
‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material.”
170
  In 
Doe v. GTE Corp., Judge Easterbrook noted that the title is “hardly an 
apt description if its principle effect is to induce ISPs to do nothing 
about the distribution of indecent and offensive materials via their 
service.”
171
  Rather, one should read the text of the CDA in conjunc-
tion with the title.
172
  Thus, § 230(c)(1) becomes a “definitional 
clause” defining those entities that are eligible for immunity under § 
230(c)(2)—those interactive computer services that take action to 
 
 166 See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1163 n.15 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he internet is no longer a fragile new means of communication that 
could easily be smothered in the cradle by overzealous enforcement of laws and reg-
ulations . . . .  And its vast reach into the lives of millions is exactly why we must be 
careful not to exceed the scope of the immunity provided by Congress.”).  But see, 
Ryan Singel, FCC Approves Net Neutrality Rule, Now the Fight Begins, WIRED (Oct. 22, 
2009, 1:29 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/10/fcc-net-neutrality/ (dis-
cussing the FCC’s recently proposed Net Neutrality Rules which will, in part, disallow 
broadband internet providers to block legal content sent over the internet by users 
and limit  users’ ability to run  lawful applications of their choice). 
 167 See supra Part II.C (discussing the recent shift in interpretation of § 230). 
 168 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE 
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (West Law School 2007).  
 169 Pub. L. No. 104, 110 Stat. 104 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S. § 230 (2006)).  Title 
V is also known as the Communications Decency Act.  Id. 
 170 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
 171 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003).  Judge Easterbrook’s analysis in GTE Corp. 
was later adopted in Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigs-
list, 519 F.3d 666, 669–70 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 172 GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 659. 
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block or screen offensive material.
173
  Under such an analysis, interac-
tive service providers that take the “do nothing” approach cannot be 
immune from all lawsuits against them. 
Congress specifically enacted § 230 to overrule Stratton Oakmont, 
Inc. v. Prodigy Service, Co.,
174
 which held an interactive computer ser-
vice liable because of its editing and removal capabilities.
175
  The Se-
nate Conference Report further suggests the limitation of the im-
munity provision by providing that the purpose of the Good 
Samaritan provisions is to protect interactive computer services from 
civil liability “for actions to restrict . . . access to objectionable online 
material.”
176
  Social networking sites, by not attempting to prevent 
identity theft, do not fall within in the Good Samaritan provision of § 
230. 
In addition, social networking sites may be deemed outside the 
reach of the § 230 immunity provision for enabling identity theft be-
cause they are not treated as the publisher or speaker of information.  
Examining multiple provisions of § 230, one court suggested a three-
pronged test to establish who qualifies for immunity.
177
  First, the web-
site must be an “interactive service provider;” second, the cause of ac-
tion must treat the website as a “publisher or speaker” of information; 
and third, another “information content provider” must have pro-
vided the information.
178
  In arguing for application of the immunity 
provision, the first prong—the requirement that the website be an in-
teractive service provider—is easy for a social networking site to prove 
because the case law explicitly places websites within the definition of 
an interactive service provider.
179
  The third requirement for immuni-
ty is also easy to prove because the information at issue is not posted 
by the social networking site itself.  All of the information that a user 
posts, including profile information, is provided by the user without 
intermediary editing or screening by the social networking site.  This 
requirement, however, might not be met because the claim at issue in 
 
 173 Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 670. 
 174 S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 194 (1996) (“One of the specific purposes of this sec-
tion is to overrule Stratton Oakmont . . . and any other similar decisions which have 
treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their 
own because they have restricted access to objectionable material.”). 
 175 No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 25, 1995).  
 176 S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 194. 
 177 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 178 Id. 
 179 See Doe v. MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846 (W.D. Tex. 2007). 
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this Comment is about the procedures in place for registering, not 
what the information content provider has posted about the user. 
Social networking sites should not receive immunity because 
they do not meet the second requirement for immunity.  The causes 
of action typically barred under § 230 are defamation and other simi-
lar claims related to the actual comments posted by another user of 
the website.
180
  Some plaintiffs have tried to mask their defamatory 
statement claims as negligence claims; however, the courts have seen 
through this “tactic” and, instead, have looked to the underlying facts 
at issue.
181
  But, bringing a claim of negligent enablement of imposter 
fraud is not a tactic to hide a claim about comments made on the site; 
rather, it is an attempt to hold social networking sites liable for their 
inadequate procedures.  The claim does not relate to a social net-
working site’s capacity as a publisher or as a speaker of its users’ con-
tent, but rather, to the social networking site’s capacity as a provider 
of the site in the first place.  Therefore, § 230 immunity would not 
cover a claim under a theory of negligent enablement of imposter 
fraud. 
Considering the legislative record for the § 230 amendment, the 
immunity provision does not apply to claims such as negligent 
enablement of imposter fraud.  As a whole, the CDA immunity was a 
mix of efforts to regulate material, specifically pornography, available 
on the Internet, promote freedom of speech on the Internet, and al-
low ISPs to self-regulate without fear of “publisher liability.”
182
  While 
Senator Exon was concerned about the availability of obscene con-
tent on the Internet and wanted to protect children and families,
183
 
Representatives Cox and Wyden wanted to put the pressure on par-




 180 See, e.g., Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 
F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 181 See, e.g., Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101; Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 
1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 182 See 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995); see also Robert Cannon, The 
Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on 
the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 52–53 (1996); Emily K. Fritts, In-
ternet Libel and the Communications Decency Act: How the Courts Erroneously Interpreted 
Congressional Intent with Regard to Liability of Internet Service Providers, 93 KY. L.J. 765, 
774–75 (2004). 
 183 141 CONG. REC. 18,046 (1994) (statement of Sen. Exon).  In 1994, Senator Ex-
on proposed an amendment to the CDA which would “update[] [the CDA]for the 
digital world of the future.” Id.  Senator Exon aimed “to protect children from being 
exposed to obscene, lewd, or indecent messages.” Id. 
 184 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Wyden) 
(“[W]e believe that parents and families are better suited to guard the portals of cy-
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The emphasis on obscenity throughout the legislative history, in addi-
tion to the text of the Act itself, suggests that the immunity provision 




In addition, the § 230 immunity should be limited for policy rea-
sons.  Imposter fraud has the potential to be extremely harmful and 
efforts to help combat this overwhelmingly prevalent crime would be 
in accord with public policy.  Furthermore, imposing liability on so-
cial networking sites does not frustrate the findings and policies at 
the foundation of the CDA.
186
  Encouraging social networking sites to 
have effective verification measures does not limit the ability of these 
sites to be a “forum for true diversity of political discourse, . . . cultur-
al development, and . . . intellectual activity,” or the ability of these 
sites to be relied on; rather, it furthers these ideas by ensuring that 
the speaker is who the speaker claims to be.
187
  Allowing liability in 
this situation also does not hinder the “continued development of the 
Internet” or the preservation of the “vibrant and competitive free 
market,” but rather it encourages it. 
2. In the Alternative, Congress Should Amend the CDA to 
Permit Liability of Social Networking Sites for Enabling 
Identity Theft 
If courts are unwilling to read the CDA immunity provision to 
exclude liability for failure to implement appropriate verification 
measures, Congress should amend the CDA to limit the current law’s 
blanket immunity.  To hold social networking sites responsible for fa-
cilitating identity theft through their websites, Congress should 
amend the current immunity provision to read, “No provider or user 
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider, except for the purposes of preventing identity theft.” 
This proposed amendment would prevent a social networking 
site from claiming § 230 immunity when the site’s ineffective preven-
 
berspace and protect our children than our Government bureaucrats.  Parents can 
get relief now from the smut on the Internet by making a quick trip to the neighbor-
hood computer store where they can purchase reasonably priced software that blocks 
out the pornography on the Internet.”); see also Meyers, supra note 76, at 172.  
 185 See 141 CONG. REC. H8469–71 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).  Every Representative 
that spoke on the proposed § 230 amendment discussed it in reference to the prob-
lem of child pornography.  Id. 
 186 See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (listing the policy goals of the 
CDA). 
 187 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3), (5) (2006). 
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tative measures allow an imposter to create an account in another’s 
name.  By creating a specific exception to the current rule, this pro-
posal would still protect social networking sites from liability for every 
word, sentence, or picture posted on the site.  Therefore, social net-
working sites would only be subject to liability if they neglect to main-
tain reasonable procedures to prevent imposter fraud. 
The CDA presents a hurdle to a plaintiff seeking redress against 
social networking sites because courts have often granted these web-
sites blanket immunity against lawsuits resulting from information 
posted on their website.  In doing so, courts effectively established the 
Internet as a place where anything goes.  In recent years, courts have 
reinterpreted the immunity provision more narrowly, which gives 
hope to plaintiffs who seek redress for imposter fraud on social net-
working sites.  In the alternative, Congress should explicitly amend 
the provision to allow for such liability.  The expansive growth and 
advancement of the Internet calls for the courts and Congress to take 
a second look at the protections that they provided when the Internet 
initially began. 
C. Applying the Cause of Action of Negligent Enablement of Imposter 
Fraud to Social Networking Sites 
The tort of negligent enablement of imposter fraud, although 
novel, remains a viable cause of action for victims of imposter fraud 
on social networking sites.  In establishing the tort of spoliation,
188
 the 
California Court of Appeal, in Smith v. Superior Court, quoted Prosser 
and Keeton: 
New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the 
progress of the common law is marked by many cases of first im-
pression, in which the court has struck out boldly to create a new 
cause of action, where none has been recognized before . . . . The 
law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of its development 
 
 188  The tort of spoliation holds an individual who “intentionally destroys, muti-
lates, or alters evidence, and thereby interferes with a person’s prospective or actual 
civil action against either the spoliator or a third person, [] liable in tort to that per-
son.”  Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation, Intentional Spoliation of Evidence, Interfering with 
Prospective Civil Action, as Actionable, 70 A.L.R.4th 984, § 2.  Although not every state 
recognizes this independent tort, over the past 10 years or so several states, such as 
Indiana and Ohio, do recognize spoliation as a tort claim.  Id.  The elements of the 
tort can vary, but one court requires: (1) “pending or probable litigation involving 
plaintiff,” (2) “knowledge on the part of defendant that litigation exists or is proba-
ble,” (3) “willful destruction of evidence by defendant designed to disrupt the plain-
tiff’s case,” (4) “disruption of plaintiff’s case,” and (5) “damages proximately caused 
by the defendant’s acts.”  Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 
(Ohio 1993). 
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are never set.  When it becomes clear that the plaintiff’s interests are en-
titled to legal protection against the conduct of the defendant, the mere 




Victims of imposter fraud are undoubtedly entitled to protection 
against the lack of action by the social networking sites.  Expanding 
the tort of negligent enablement of imposter fraud to cover social 
networking sites would not only provide victims with a realistic reme-
dy, but would also encourage social networking sites to increase secu-
rity and regulating measures and ultimately decrease the instances of 
imposter fraud. 
The tort of negligent enablement of imposter fraud is similar to 
the traditional tort of negligence.  Negligent conduct is characterized 
as that which “falls below the standard established by law for the pro-
tection of others against unreasonable risk of harm,” and the stan-
dard is “that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.”
190
  To es-
tablish a cause of action for negligent enablement of imposter fraud, 
the plaintiff must show the following elements: (1) the defendant 
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff to prevent or attempt the prevent 
imposter fraud from occurring, (2) the defendant breached that duty 
by failing to attempt to prevent imposter fraud from occurring, (3) 
the defendant’s failure caused injury to the plaintiff, and (4) the 
plaintiff suffered an injury for which a court can award damages.
191
  
The first and most difficult element to prove is the existence of a du-
ty.  The plaintiff must convince the court to impose a duty on social 
networking sites to act reasonably when allowing users to register. 
1. Social Networking Sites Should Have a Duty to 
Implement Reasonable Protections Against  
Imposter Fraud 
Social networking sites should have a duty to third parties to im-
plement reasonable registration procedures protecting against im-
poster fraud.  Defined, a duty is “an obligation, to which the law will 
give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of 
conduct toward another.”
192
  The general rule is that no legal duty ex-
 
 189 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 495–96 (Ct. App. 1984) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1, at 3–4 (4th ed. (1971))). 
 190 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965). 
 191 See id. § 281 (detailing the elements of a cause of action for negligence). 
 192 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (W. 
Page ed., 5th ed. 1984). 
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ists to prevent harm to third parties.
193
  But, courts do impose a duty 
on third parties in the presence of special circumstances or relation-
ship.  When determining whether a duty exists, courts often consider 
questions of policy and fairness, including the type of injury or harm, 
the foreseeability of the injury or harm, the relationship between the 
parties, and other public policy and social considerations.
194
 
Although foreseeability does not establish a duty in itself, the 
fact that the harm is foreseeable is a “crucial element” given signifi-
cant consideration.
195
  Courts generally use foreseeability to limit a 
tortfeasor’s liability; however, it has also been used to create a legal 
duty.
196
  Interpreting Judge Cardozo’s language in Palsgraf v. Long Isl-
and Railroad, William Prosser stated, “Negligence must be a matter of 
some relation between the parties, some duty, which could be 
founded only on foreseeability of some harm to the plaintiff in fact 
injured.”
197
  Courts have adopted foreseeability as the central element 
to establish a legal duty.
198
 
In the context of social networking sites, it is reasonably foresee-
able that the relaxed “honor code” mechanisms in place for registra-
tion allow an individual to register for these sites as someone else, 
which results in a myriad of potential harms.  The absence of any 
form of verification creates a limitless opportunity for fraud.  To 
create an account on a social networking site, an imposter simply 
needs to create a fake email address to which the account will be 
linked and enter a few basic personal facts.
199
  Anyone who has the 
slightest bit of personal information available on the Internet is only 
a few clicks away from an imposter creating an account in his or her 
 
 193 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(b) (1965). 
 194 See, e.g., Key v. Compass Bank, 826 So. 2d 159, 170 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001); Chi 
Lap Yan v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., No. 1:03-CV-1980-SEB-JPG, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
33819, at *11 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 2, 2005) (holding that to determine the existence of a 
duty, three factors are balanced: (1) the relationship between the parties, (2) the 
reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured, and (3) public concerns); 
Piscitelli v. Classic Residence by Hyatt, 973 A.2d 948, 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2009). 
 195 Piscitelli, 973 A.2d at 966 (citing Carter Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. EMAR Grp., 
Inc., 638 A.2d 1288, 1294 (N.J. 1994)). 
 196 Steffen Nolte, The Spoliation Tort: An Approach to Underlying Principles, 26 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 351, 376 (1994). 
 197 William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1953).  Judge Car-
dozo first referenced foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff in the context of duty in 
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). 
 198 Nolte, supra note 196 (listing several courts relying on foreseeability as the 
primary element in determining duty). 
 199 See supra note 69–70 and accompanying text (discussing how imposters can eas-
ily generate a profile in someone else’s name). 
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name.  Although the harm from imposter fraud is highly foreseeable, 




Although a traditional relationship does not exist between a vic-
tim of imposter fraud and a social networking site, a special relation-
ship nonetheless exists, which gives another reason for courts to im-
pose a duty.  The only connection between the parties is likely to be 
through the imposter.  One scholar, however, suggests that this is 
enough: “Although the victimized individual is not a bank ‘customer’ 
in the traditional sense, the financial institution acts under the pre-
sumption that the named individual is the ‘customer’ when the im-
poster presents the named individual’s identifying information.”
201
  
Similarly, a social networking site operates as if the victim is a user or 
a member until notified about the fraud.  Therefore, the “third-party” 
victim has a pseudo-relationship with the social networking site. 
Imposing a duty is also appropriate because such a duty would 
not be too burdensome on social networking sites.  Although the 
harm may be foreseeable, courts are not likely to impose a duty if the 
imposition will be unfair, either physically or financially.
202
  Verifica-
tion technology currently exists and a few social networking sites, 
such as eHarmony.com and Funky Sexy Cool, have started to offer ve-
rification as an option to its users.
203
  IDology and RelyID currently of-
 
 200 Courts place varying emphasis on the foreseeability requirement.  See, e.g., Pa-
trick v. Union State Bank 681 So. 2d 1364, 1368 (Ala. 1995) (holding that the ability 
to foresee the injury is the “key factor”); Carter Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. EMAR Grp. 
Inc., 638 A.2d 1288, 1294 (N.J. 1994) (noting that foreseeability is a “crucial ele-
ment” but not the only element); Huggins v, Citibank, 585 S.E.2d 275, 277 (S.C. 
2003) (“[F]oreseeability alone does not give rise to a duty.”); Wolfe v. MBNA Am. 
Bank, 485 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882 (W.D. Tenn. 2007) (“[A court] must examine all the 
relevant circumstances with an emphasis on the foreseeability of the alleged harm.”). 
 201 Heather M. Howard, The Negligent Enablement of Imposter Fraud: A Common-Sense 
Common Law Claim, 54 DUKE L.J. 1263, 1286–87 (2005).  This approach is similar to 
that taken by the court in Patrick.  See Patrick, 681 So. 2d at 1369 (“The fact that the 
relationship defies common categorization does not mean that there is no relation-
ship.”). 
 202 See, e.g., Piscitelli v. Classic Residence by Hyatt, 973 A.2d 948, 967 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2009) 
 203 Zack Martin, Social Networking Sites Have Little to No Identity Verification, CR80 
NEWS (Mar. 31, 2008), http://www.cr80news.com/2008/03/31/social-networking-
sites-have-little-to-no-identity-verification; see also Trulioo Launches Internet ID Verifica-
tion System, VILLAGE GAMER (Sept. 1, 2009), 
http://www.villagegamer.net/2009/09/01/trulioo-launches-internet-id-verification-
system [hereinafter Trulioo Launches].  
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fer identification- and age-verification technology.
204
  IDology’s soft-
ware takes information provided by the consumer, such as name, year 
of birth, and residence zip code, and searches through public data 
records to verify the identity of the consumer.
205
  IDology also offers 
advanced software, which generates multiple choice questions from 
the information provided, including questions about historical ad-
dresses, people the user knows, and cars the user has owned.
206
  Simi-
larly, RelyID’s technology checks public record databases and comes 
back with a multiple-choice quiz.  Then, upon passing the quiz, the 
user becomes verified.
207
  This technology is limited in the instance of 
minors because they lack public data.
208
  A solution to this problem, 
however, could be to require a parent—verified through the public 
record searching technology—to confirm that his or her child is who 
the child claims to be.
209
  In addition, another available software veri-
fies a person’s identity by asking questions to that person’s “friends” 
or contacts on the social networking site.
210
  A concern, however, is 
that these verification systems can be costly.
211
  Although expensive at 
the moment, the cost can likely be reduced as the demand for verifi-
cation systems increases (because of the threat of potential liability).  
In addition, social networking sites can deflect the cost of the system 
to the users or advertisers. 
Furthermore, courts should impose a duty on social networking 
sites because such a duty is in the best interest of the public.  Courts 
look to a variety of public policy interests, such as who is in the best 
position to prevent the harm, to determine if imposing a duty is im-
portant.
212
  In this situation, social networking sites are the first and 
the last line of defense against imposter fraud.  Apart from preemp-
 
 204 See Solutions for ID verification, IDOLOGY, 
http://www.idology.com/solutions/solutions (last visited Mar. 16, 2011); Products, 
RELYID, http://www.relyid.com/products.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2011).  
 205 John Dancu, Using Identity and Age Verification within Social Networking Sites, 
IDOLOGY 1 (July 21, 2008), 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/IDology_ISTTFTAB
_submission.pdf.  
 206 Id.  
 207 Martin, supra note 203. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id.  
 210 Trulioo Launches, supra note 203.  The Trulioo technology is currently available 
on Facebook as an optional application. Id. See TRULIOO, http://trulioo.com (last vi-
sited Feb. 13, 2011). 
 211 Martin, supra note 203.  IDology charges thirty-seven cents per verification.  Id. 
 212 See, e.g., Piscitelli v. Classic Residence by Hyatt, 973 A.2d 948, 114 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2009). 
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tively creating a profile on all social networking sites, individuals can 
do very little to prevent imposter fraud.  In addition, often a victim 
does not realize that someone has been “posing” as him or her for 
quite a while and by the time the victim discovers the fraud, the dam-
age has already been done.  Social networking sites, however, are in a 
prime position to prevent imposters from having the opportunity to 
commit this crime.  The value of protecting individuals’ identity, es-
pecially when identity theft is on a rapid rise, is likely to trump any 
public policy considerations to the contrary. 
2. The Social Networking Site’s Failure to Implement 
Reasonable Registration Procedures Causes  
Imposter Fraud 
Social networking sites should be liable against victims of impos-
ter fraud on their sites because their failure to reasonably regulate 
how members register for the site causes imposter fraud to occur.  In 
proving the element of causation, a plaintiff will need to show that 
the site’s breach of the duty to impose reasonable procedures pre-
venting imposter fraud caused the plaintiff’s injury.
213
  Causation is 
established if the defendant’s conduct was a “substantial factor in 
bringing about the harm.”
214
  To prevent extensive liability, an indi-
vidual is not held liable for negligent conduct if the conduct was too 
far removed from the injury.
215
  Generally, courts do not recognize 
causation when no one could reasonably foresee the injury. 
In this context, a social networking site’s lack of appropriate 
procedures for registration enables the imposter to create a false pro-
file.  As discussed above, website operators can reasonably foresee 
that without a verification system or procedure in place, imposter 
fraud could occur on the site.  Thus, if reasonable procedures were in 





 213 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (1965). 
 214 Id. § 431. 
 215 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) (limiting liability in 
order to avoid creating “liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate 
time to an indeterminate class”). 
 216 If an instance of imposter fraud by chance occurs despite the site’s procedures, 
the site would not be liable if the procedures in place were reasonable. 
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3 The Lack of Reasonable Procedures Harms Victims of 
Imposter Fraud 
A victim of imposter fraud on social networking sites suffers in-
jury as a result of the site’s negligence.  Although the specific injuries 
vary between plaintiffs, victims of imposter fraud, just like victims of 
traditional identity theft, have the potential to suffer a wide array of 
harm.
217
  Damages could stem from money and time spent clearing 
one’s name to emotional distress from the incident.
218
  The purpose 
of damages is to “punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct,”
219
 
and providing damages in this scenario unquestionably punishes so-
cial networking sites for their neglect and deters similar neglect in 
the future. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Identity theft has been an established crime for some time; how-
ever, it has recently become one of the fastest-growing crimes and 
concerns among Americans.
220
  With this has come the development 
of a new form of identity theft—imposter fraud on social networking 
sites.  Today, the information needed to assume another’s identity is 
readily available on the Internet.  Easy access to important informa-
tion on the Internet, combined with the lack of verification proce-
dures on social networking sites, creates limitless opportunities for 
fraud.  Skilled identity thieves and innocent, computer-savvy 
youngsters can pose as someone else on these websites to play a 
harmless prank on friends, or even worse, to cause serious harms to 
their victims. 
Both Congress and state legislatures criminalized identity theft, 
which resulted in either monetary fines or incarceration.
221
  The 
complexities of the Internet, however, make actually finding the per-
petrator very difficult.  Therefore, plaintiffs should be able to turn to 
another source of the crime to obtain relief—the social networking 
sites themselves.  The CDA has traditionally insulated these sites from 
liability for negligence-based claims such as defamation, but an analy-
sis of more recent interpretations of the CDA suggests that courts are 
re-thinking this blanket immunity.  Given this recent change in direc-
tion, a court addressing a plaintiff’s claim against a social networking 
 
 217 See supra Part II.B. 
 218 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 219 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(c) (1965). 
 220 See supra Part II.B. 
 221 See supra Part II.D. 
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site for enabling imposter fraud because of a failure to implement 
reasonable registration procedures should read the CDA to allow 
such a claim because the site would not be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of the content.  In the alternative, the legislature should 
amend the CDA to allow for an exception for preventing imposter 
fraud and identity theft. 
Although met with skepticism in some courts, negligent enable-
ment of imposter fraud is the most appropriate legal mechanism to 
combat imposter fraud on social networking sites.  A plaintiff at-
tempting to use this tort will need to show that the social networking 
site owed a duty to the public-at-large to implement reasonable regis-
tration procedures and, by failing to do so, caused injury or damages.  
Expanding this tort to the context of social networking sites affords 
victims of imposter fraud a method of relief and forces social net-
working sites to take proactive measures to prevent plaintiff imposter 
fraud on their sites in the first place.  The risk of liability will ulti-
mately create a safer Internet without hindering its positive aspects. 
